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unhappy-path-audit

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Full-codebase MatrixOne unhappy-path audit for leak, double cleanup, hung, and OOM risks using the Q1-Q3 framework plus ownership and wait-for graphs. Use for resource lifecycle, cancellation/close/fail-fast paths, goroutines, locks/channels/RPC waits, restart/reuse generations, or unbounded growth audits.

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Unhappy Path Audit Skill

Core Logic (First Principles)

Unhappy path auditing = answering three propositions:

QPropositionViolation Consequence
Q1: Every creation has one effective destruction ownerOwnership may transfer or be ref-counted, but each resource reaches cleanup and cleanup executes effectively onceLeak / double cleanup
Q2: Every wait dependency chain has a terminationEvery explicit or implicit blocking edge reaches a guaranteed release, cancellation, or bounded timeoutHung
Q3: Every accumulation has an upper boundFor every unbounded-growth container → capacity limit or recycling mechanismOOM

Key principle: Not "looks like it might leak/hang", but "prove it definitely leaks/hangs". Q1 includes ownership cardinality, not only the presence of a destructor. Q2 includes mutex, channel, callback, RPC, I/O, and retry dependencies, not only functions named Wait. Exhaust every bypass and release path before ruling.


Systematic Method (Drill-Down Algorithm)

Entry function
  └→ Layer 1: Execute Q1-Q3 on every resource/wait/accumulation point
      ├─ Termination condition satisfied at this layer → ✅, stop drill-down
      └─ Termination condition depends on a lower layer → ⬇ drill down to Layer 2
          └→ Recurse with Q1-Q3

Drill-Down Example

proxy.Close()
  └→ tunnel.Close()                 ← Q1: Destruction guaranteed? ✅ (defer)
      └→ pipe.kickoff() exit        ← Q2: io.EOF guaranteed? → depends on connection.Close()
          └→ connection.Close()     ← Q2: Close guaranteed? → depends on morpc readLoop detection
              └→ morpc readLoop     ← Q2: Condition for detecting close?
                  ├─ readTimeout > 0 → periodic return + detect → ✅
                  └─ readTimeout = 0 → forever blocked on conn.Read → ❌ Bug

Audit Workflow

Phase 1 — Scope Definition

Input: target module list
Actions:
  1. Trace the complete call chain from entry to exit
  2. Number layers: Layer 1, Layer 2, ... Layer N
  3. Mark each layer's concern dimensions (goroutine/connection/lock/memory/...)
  4. Draw resource ownership transfers and wait-for edges
  5. Mark restart/retry/pool generation boundaries
Output: audit scope matrix

Phase 2 — Per-Layer Audit

For each Layer:
  1. read_file ≤ 6 files (hard limit)
  2. Execute Q1-Q3 on this layer, including ownership cardinality and hidden wait edges
  3. Record verdict + layer number where termination condition is satisfied
  4. If termination depends on a lower layer → mark drill-down target, do not conclude at this layer
  5. Output this layer's audit table → then proceed to the next layer

Anti-false-positive rule: For every wait point, first exhaust all release paths (including defer, cancel watcher, timer goroutine). Follow indirect edges such as reject → mutex → owner → RPC; a control path is not fail-fast merely because it returns an error after the owner eventually releases it. Only rule it hung when every path is confirmed unreachable.

Phase 3 — Synthesis

1. Merge all layer audit tables
2. Extract failed Q1/Q2/Q3 items
3. Verify termination chain integrity (no break from entry to exit)
4. Apply Bug Claim Verification Checklist (see Critical Rules) to each candidate
5. Generate Issue templates for confirmed Bugs
Output: final risk matrix + Bug list

Output Format

Per-Layer Audit Table (Phase 2 output)

Layer N: [Module Name] ([File Name])

| Q | Proposition | Code Path | Verdict | Termination Layer |
|---|-------------|-----------|---------|-------------------|
| Q1 | creation→destruction | go xxx() → defer close() | ✅ | Layer N |
| Q2 | wait→termination | cond.Wait() → Broadcast | ✅ | Layer N (cancel watcher) |
| Q3 | accumulation→bound | channel | ✅ | Layer N |

Final Risk Matrix (Phase 3 output)

| # | Bug | Layer | Q | Severity | Issue |
|---|-----|-------|---|----------|-------|
| 1 | [description] | Layer X | Q2 | High | #12345 |

Termination Chain Verification (Phase 3 output)

Entry
  └→ Layer 1: destruction call ✅
      └→ Layer 2: wait released ✅
          └→ Layer 3: **BREAK** ← Q1 destruction unreachable

Critical Rules

Core Rules

  1. Anti-confirmation-bias: prove "definitely leaks/hangs", not "looks like it might" — exhaust all bypass paths before ruling
  2. Batch hard limit: ≤ 6 read_file per batch, must output audit conclusion for that batch before continuing
  3. Exit self-check: before ending the turn confirm — ①conclusion in first paragraph ②audit table present ③Bug has Issue
  4. Drill-down discipline: when termination condition is not satisfied, mark "pending drill-down", do not speculate at the current layer

Bug Claim Verification Checklist (BEFORE filing ANY bug)

Every bug claim MUST pass all 5 gates before being included in the final report:

#GateVerification ActionAnti-Pattern (caught by spill audit)
G1FULL-GRAPHTrace ownership to ALL terminal nodes and prove one effective cleanup owner on every pathBug: found a destructor but missed a second concurrent owner, or stopped before the real terminal holder
G2CAN-FAIL/BLOCKOpen the alleged function and every wait-for dependency; confirm it can actually fail, panic, or blockBug: called a path fail-fast without noticing its mutex owner was blocked in downstream I/O
G3SYMMETRYFor every growth claim (append/push/alloc), grep the variable name + = nil / = make / truncate; confirm NO reset point exists anywhere in the lifecycleBug: saw spillIndex = append(...), missed spillIndex = nil in cleanupSpill()
G4LINE-REREADRe-read every cited line number AFTER forming the bug hypothesis — do not trust memory from the initial readBug: asserted ctr.state doesn't become SendSucceed on failure; line 127 shows it's unconditional
G5CALIBRATE-LASTSeverity (Low/Medium/High) assigned ONLY after G1-G4 pass AND all bugs in the batch are confirmed. Never assign severity during discoveryBug was Medium → turned out to be false positive (severity meaningless)

Process rule: G1-G4 are per-bug gates applied during Phase 2→3 transition. G5 is a global gate applied after the full bug list is finalized. Any bug failing G1-G4 is discarded, not downgraded.

G1 Detail: Full-Graph Traversal

For every resource (fd, lock, goroutine, memory allocation), construct the complete directed ownership graph:

Creation Point ──transfer──→ Holder A ──transfer──→ Holder B ──transfer──→ ...
                                  │                    │
                                  ▼                    ▼
                              Reset()              Destroy()
                              Free()               FreeMemory()

Required actions per node:

  1. Identify every transfer function (hand-off, assignment, message send)
  2. For each transfer target, locate its destruction path
  3. Verify destruction path is reachable on error branches too
  4. Prove competing branches cannot both execute irreversible cleanup, unless the destructor itself is verified idempotent
  5. Repeat until reaching a node with NO further transfer (terminal)

Stop condition: Graph is complete when every leaf is either (a) a verified destructor call, or (b) a GC-managed resource with bounded lifetime.

Q2 Detail: Wait-For And Control Paths

Construct a wait-for graph for each potentially blocking path:

caller -> mutex/channel/future -> owner/receiver -> RPC/I/O/callback -> release

Cancellation, close, abort, timeout, health-check, and rejection paths must be independent of the work they control. If such a path acquires a lock held across downstream work, sends into that work's queue, or synchronously waits for its cleanup, it inherits the downstream termination condition. Trace to the local edge that guarantees progress; a caller context alone is insufficient if the blocked primitive does not observe it.

For restart/retry/pooling, include generation edges: old callbacks and handles must terminate before reuse, and new state must remain unpublished until all admission gates are ready.

G3 Detail: Symmetry Check

For any variable V that exhibits growth (append, map[K]=V, channel send, allocation):

  1. Find all assignments to V (grep V\s*=)
  2. Confirm one of these assigns nil / empty / zero
  3. Verify that assignment is ALWAYS reached before the variable goes out of scope

Common false positive: variable is reset in a function you haven't read yet (e.g., Reset(), Free(), cleanup()). Always search for these BEFORE filing a Q3 bug.


Appendix A: Module Threat Model Reference

A.1 Proxy / Execution Dispatch Layer

Resource CreationDestruction PathWait PointRelease EventAccumulationBounded By
go handleConnection()defer cc.Close()handleOneMessage() reading from clientio.EOF / ctx.Done() / errconnection countmaxConnections
go pipe.kickoff() (×2)src.Shutdown() → io.EOFcond.Wait() in pausecancel watcher goroutine + timercnTunnels mapCN count × per-CN connection count
placeholder tunnelselectOneFailed()selectOne() selecting CNimmediate return——
transfer goroutinedefer finishTransfer()pause() cond.WaitdefaultTransferTimeout=10s——

A.2 morpc / RPC Transport Layer

Resource CreationDestruction PathWait PointRelease EventAccumulationBounded By
readLoop goroutineconn.Read() returns error / readTimeout triggers ctx checkconn.Read(readOptions)readTimeout > 0 → periodic returnbackend poolmaxConnections
writeLoop goroutinedefer closeConn(false)writeLoop ctxctx.Done()——
backend connectionGC manager (idle check + inactive check)——idle backendmaxIdleDuration
FutureGet(ctx) return / GCf.Get(ctx)ctx deadline——

A.3 Compile / Remote Execution Layer

Resource CreationDestruction PathWait PointRelease EventAccumulationBounded By
sender goroutinessender.close() in RemoteRun defersendPipeline each sendcaller ctx——
messageSenderOnClient goroutine<-receiver.connectionCtx.Done()stream.Get()ctx / stream close——
stream senderClose(true) → pool return + gauge decwaitingTheStopResponse()30s timeoutstream poolsync.Pool
messageReceiverOnServer goroutine<-receiver.connectionCtx.Done()NotifyDispatchconnectionCtx.Done() + dispatchProc.Ctx.Done()——
dispatch goroutinesproc.Ctx.Done() / channel closechannel send (non-blocking)non-blocking select + default fallbackchannel bufferChannelBufferSize

A.4 Pipeline / Computation Execution Layer

Resource CreationDestruction PathWait PointRelease EventAccumulationBounded By
Pipeline scopedefer p.Cleanup(s.Proc, err, isPrepare, err)merge (non-blocking)—batchesbat.Clean(mp) per-batch release
pipelines in ants poolpool full → errSubmit → errCRun() waiting completionerrC / errMergeC / scope.Run completionmpool allocpool cap

A.5 Txn / Transaction Layer

Resource CreationDestruction PathWait PointRelease EventAccumulationBounded By
txnClientClose()doCreateTxn in paused statepausedC close on Resume/client Close, or caller contextwaiting user txnsrequest concurrency; entries removed on cancel/close
txn operatorcloseTxn() commit/rollback pathdoSend() 2PC commitcaller ctx (SQL executor timeout)——
lock (unlock error path)lockService.Unlock() infinite retry (max backoff 5s)————

A.6 Lock Service Layer

Resource CreationDestruction PathWait PointRelease EventAccumulationBounded By
remoteLockTableclose() + RemoteLockTimeout=10min TTLLock wait queuetxn commit/rollback → unlock / timeoutlock table sizebounded by active txn count
bind infohandleError() actively detects bind changes + allocator query————
remote lock (on remote CN)RemoteLockTimeout=10min TTL (remote CN cleanup)————

A.7 Frontend / Session Layer

Resource CreationDestruction PathWait PointRelease EventAccumulationBounded By
sessionsession.RemoveSession()MySQL protocol readio.EOF / ctx.Done()session varsbounded per session
RoutineManager routinedeleteRoutine + rt.cleanup()————
prepared stmt cachereleased on session close——cache sizeper-session limit

A.8 CN Lifecycle Layer

Resource CreationDestruction PathWait PointRelease EventAccumulationBounded By
CN services (net, query, txn, lock, pipeline, engine)Close() in reverse order, independent try-catch per phase————
RPC clients (txn/hakeeper/query/timestamp)stopRPCs()————
drain connectionsrebalancer handleTransfer → tunnel.Close()rebalancer migrationtunnel timeoutmigrating connectionsdrain grace period
PipelineClientClose()————

A.9 TAE / Storage Engine Layer (disttae)

Resource CreationDestruction PathWait PointRelease EventAccumulationBounded By
block handle / filerefcount → 0 / defer closeIO waitIO completion / timeoutblock cacheLRU eviction / size cap
txn state (MVCC)txn commit/rollback → version cleanuplock contention on blocktxn commit/rollbackactive versionsGC watermark
partition readerClose()logtail fetchmaxTimeToWaitServerResponse=60s——
partition statecheckpoint + gcPartitionStateTicker=20min——partition state entriescheckpoint cleanup
snapshotsnapshot release on txn completion————
logtail consumer goroutinestopConsumers() + ctx.Done()receiveOneLogtail()maxTimeToWaitServerResponse=60s——

A.10 Log Service / Replication Layer

Resource CreationDestruction PathWait PointRelease EventAccumulationBounded By
subscription goroutinectx.Done() → stop()logtail receivequorum ack timeout + retryWAL buffersize cap + flush
RPC connectionClose()heartbeat timeoutleader lease expiration——
checkpoint goroutinectx.Done()checkpoint sync waitquorum sync timeout——

A.11 Hakeeper / Gossip Membership Layer

Resource CreationDestruction PathWait PointRelease EventAccumulationBounded By
heartbeat goroutinectx.Done() / Close()heartbeat timeoutnext ticker intervalmember listcluster size × state
gossip connectionClose()gossip sync timeoutpeer timeoutpending messagessend buffer cap

Appendix B: Distributed Component Wait Termination Models

Wait TypeTermination ConditionCommon Protection Patterns
Local I/O waitIO completion / timeoutctx.Done(), readTimeout, writeTimeout
Quorum waitmajority response / timeoutquorum ack deadline → retry or downgrade
Heartbeat waittimeout → mark peer deadheartbeat interval × failure threshold
Lock wait (local)lock holder release / timeoutRemoteLockTimeout TTL, deadlock detector
Lock wait (distributed)remote lock TTL + bind change detectionhandleError() + allocator query

Appendix C: Common False Positive Patterns

False Positive PatternCorrect Adjudication PathGate Violated
See cond.Wait() without timeout → report hungExhaust all Broadcast() call sites (including defer, cancel watcher, timer goroutine)—
See goroutine launched without explicit stop → report leakCheck goroutine-internal exit paths: ctx.Done() / io.EOF / channel close—
See sync.Map.Store without delete → report OOMCheck TTL / active GC cleanup / refcount→0 cleanup—
See close() without sending RPC → report resource leakCheck if remote has TTL self-cleanup / bind change detection—
See RPC wait without timeout → report hungTrace upward context for deadline, check if caller guarantees cancel—
See channel send potentially blocking → report hungVerify non-blocking (select + default), or guarantee receiver always consumes—
See fail-fast error return → assume prompt rejectionDraw reject → lock/channel → owner → downstream and prove the control path has an independent boundG2
See one cleanup callback → assume exactly-once cleanupTrace all public terminal calls, retry paths, and callbacks; prove exclusive ownership or destructor idempotenceG1
See reset/reopen under a lock → assume generation safetyTrace old callbacks/handles and publication order across restart or pool reuseG1/G2
See resource transferred to next holder, close not found in current scope → report leakTrace ownership to ALL terminal nodes — next holder may have Destroy()/FreeMemory()G1
See append/push without bound in current scope → report OOMGrep variable + = nil — cleanup function in sibling file may reset itG3
See function call that "might" panic → report fd leak on panic pathOpen function body — nil-check+assign or simple arithmetic cannot panicG2
See SendMessage return error → assume upstream state machine doesn't clean upRe-read the exact line where state is set — it may be unconditionalG4