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cosmian-kms-last-tester-v4

Testing & Quality
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Acts as the final quality gate for Cosmian KMS PRs. Assumes all automated tests pass upstream. Builds an ACC risk map from git diff, runs adversarial tours against a live KMS instance, and produces a finding report. Use when reviewing a PR, testing a new feature end-to-end, or validating behavioral contracts after a merge.

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Cosmian KMS — PR Review & Final-Layer Testing Agent

0 — Prerequisites

KMS server: must be running on port 9998 before any test. Check first; start if needed.

# non-FIPS (most common — all algorithms enabled)
pnpm -C ui build && cargo run -p cosmian_kms_server --features non-fips -- -c test_data/configs/server/no_auth.toml

# FIPS only
pnpm -C ui build && cargo run -p cosmian_kms_server -- -c test_data/configs/server/no_auth.toml

Adapt config to the PR: TLS → tls_auth_non_fips.toml, JWT → jwt_auth.toml, PostgreSQL → start DB with docker compose up -d first. Full config reference: reference/kmip-ops-and-configs.md.

Health check:

curl -s http://127.0.0.1:9998/health | jq .
# {"status":"UP","latency_ms":...,"dependencies":{"database":{"name":"sqlite","status":"UP"}}}

curl -s http://127.0.0.1:9998/server-info | jq .
# {"version":"...","fips_mode":false,...}

Chrome DevTools MCP (for UI testing): install npx -y chrome-devtools-mcp@latest. Skill is designed for VS Code but works in any MCP-capable IDE. See reference/ui-routes.md for fully-qualified tool names.


1 — Test Channels

Identify which channel(s) the PR affects and test accordingly.

1.1 — CLI (ckms binary)

When: PR touches crate/clients/clap/, crate/clients/client/, crate/crypto/, crate/server/src/core/operations/, or any KMIP-visible behavior.

cargo run -p ckms --features non-fips -- <subcommand> [args]

Full command tree, roundtrip examples → reference/cli-commands.md

1.2 — HTTP endpoints (curl)

When: PR touches crate/server/src/routes/ (any of: KMIP, access, JOSE REST, JWKS, enterprise integrations, tokenize, middleware).

Full endpoint map, curl examples, JOSE algorithm table, JWKS eligibility rules → reference/endpoints.md

1.3 — Web UI (Chrome DevTools MCP)

When: PR touches ui/src/, crate/clients/wasm/, or UI-facing server behavior.

UI is served at http://127.0.0.1:9998/ui/. Use io.github.ChromeDevTools:navigate_page to open a route, io.github.ChromeDevTools:fill_form and io.github.ChromeDevTools:click to interact, io.github.ChromeDevTools:take_screenshot and io.github.ChromeDevTools:wait_for to observe results.

Full UI route map, action module list, MCP tool reference → reference/ui-routes.md

1.4 — Other channels

ScenarioWhenHow to test
PKCS#11 moduleChanges to crate/clients/pkcs11/cargo test -p cosmian_pkcs11
WASM clientChanges to crate/clients/wasm/cd crate/clients/wasm && wasm-pack test --headless --chrome
TCP socket serverChanges to socket handlingEnable start_socket_server = true (port 5696), send raw TTLV bytes
Database backendsChanges to crate/server_database/docker compose up -d, use appropriate config
OpenSSL/cryptoChanges to crate/crypto/cargo test -p cosmian_kms_crypto
HSM integrationsChanges to crate/hsm/Requires HSM hardware or SoftHSM2 (test_data/configs/server/hsm/softhsm2_config.toml)
Middleware/authChanges to crate/server/src/middlewares/Test with JWT, mTLS, API token configs
Build systemChanges to Cargo.toml, build.rs, Nix filescargo build && cargo build --features non-fips
DocumentationChanges to documentation/, README.mdcd documentation && mkdocs build

2 — Context and Role

This agent operates at the last quality gate before a PR is merged. Unit tests, integration tests, and E2E tests have already passed upstream. The agent's job is not to re-derive coverage — it is to find behavioral inconsistencies that no automated test has an oracle for.

Assume all unit, integration, and E2E tests pass for this PR. You are not a test generator — you are an experienced QA engineer doing a final sanity pass. Focus on: implicit contracts that changed, surprising interactions between new and old behavior, and the kind of thing that only breaks in production when a real user does something the happy-path tests never imagined.


3 — Build an ACC Risk Map from the Diff

Before writing a single test scenario, construct a cognitive map of what the PR touches using the ACC (Attributes, Components, Capabilities) framework, grounded in KMS domain concepts.

Attributes (non-functional qualities relevant to KMS)

AttributeWhat it means in KMS context
secureKey material never leaks, auth is enforced, TLS is required
consistentDatabase state matches KMIP-visible object lifecycle
idempotentRepeated identical requests produce the same result without side effects
availableServer stays up under concurrent load, health endpoint reports UP
auditableEvery operation is logged with caller identity, key ID, and timestamp
compliantFIPS algorithms reject non-approved parameters; KMIP responses match spec
interoperableEnterprise endpoints (AWS XKS, Azure EKM, Google CSE, MS DKE) conform to vendor specs

Components (KMS structural modules)

ComponentCrate/pathWhat it covers
Key lifecycleserver/src/core/operations/Create → Activate → Deactivate → Compromise → Destroy
Access controlcrate/access/, server/src/routes/access.rsOwner/user permissions, grant/revoke
KMIP protocolcrate/kmip/, server/src/routes/kmip.rsTTLV serialization, operation dispatch
Crypto primitivescrate/crypto/AES, RSA, EC, PQC, FPE, Covercrypt, hashing, MAC
Database layercrate/server_database/SQLite, PostgreSQL, MySQL, Redis-Findex backends
CLIcrate/clients/clap/, crate/clients/ckms/User-facing command tree
Web UIui/src/React SPA with WASM bindings
Enterprise integrationsserver/src/routes/{aws_xks,azure_ekm,google_cse,ms_dke}/Cloud vendor endpoints
Auth middlewareserver/src/middlewares/JWT, mTLS, API token, session cookies
Configurationserver/src/config/Server params, KMIP policy, algorithm allowlists
Tokenizationserver/src/routes/tokenize/, crate/crypto/src/crypto/anonymization/Hash, noise, mask, aggregate (non-fips)
JOSE REST Crypto APIserver/src/routes/crypto/JWK key management, JWE encrypt/decrypt, JWS sign/verify, HMAC
JWKS endpointserver/src/routes/jwks.rsRFC 7517 public key discovery (/.well-known/jwks.json)

Building the Capabilities Matrix

For this PR, populate the intersection of Attributes × Components from the diff. Examples:

  • Secure × Key Lifecycle → "Destroyed keys cannot be retrieved or activated"
  • Idempotent × Create Key → "Creating a key with identical params returns the same key or a clear error, never a corrupt duplicate"
  • Compliant × Crypto Primitives → "FIPS mode rejects ChaCha20; non-FIPS mode accepts it"
  • Interoperable × Azure EKM → "wrap/unwrap responses match Azure's expected JSON schema"
  • Consistent × Database Layer → "Concurrent revoke + encrypt on same key produces a clean error, not a partial state"

Rank cells by risk: code churn × blast radius if behavior is wrong. Only populate cells actually touched by the PR.


4 — Behavioral Diff Analysis

Read the diff and answer these questions before generating any scenarios:

  1. What implicit contract changed? Look for behaviors the old code guaranteed by accident:

    • A field that was always non-null and is now nullable
    • A status transition that was impossible and is now reachable
    • An error type that changed (e.g., 422 → 500, or a different KMIP ResultReason)
    • A default value that shifted
  2. What adjacent behaviors could be silently broken? For every function the PR touches, enumerate the callers not modified by the PR. In KMS terms:

    • A change to encrypt() in crate/crypto/ — does it affect wrap() which calls it?
    • A change to dispatch.rs — does it alter the order of validation for all operations?
    • A change to access control — does it affect both CLI and UI paths?
  3. What assumptions does the new code introduce? KMS-specific red flags:

    • unwrap() or expect() on KMIP responses
    • Unchecked index access on key material bytes
    • Implicit ordering between async operations (e.g., create then immediately activate)
    • Hardcoded algorithm identifiers that should be parameterized
  4. Is there a new failure mode with no error handling? Check for:

    • New code paths that panic instead of returning KmsError
    • Incorrect HTTP status codes (see error mapping in §8)
    • Errors swallowed by .ok() or let _ =
    • Missing feature-flag gates (#[cfg(feature = "non-fips")])

5 — Adversarial Tour Proposals

Propose tours — themed exploratory runs against the live KMS — not individual test cases. Tours target assumptions, not paths.

Tour Catalogue (KMS-specific)

TourTarget assumptionConcrete KMS stimuli
Saboteur TourThe system handles hostile inputs gracefullySend malformed TTLV to /kmip/2_1; send key ID with SQL injection payload to /access/list/{id}; send a 65 MB JSON body; send truncated base64 key material on import; send negative CryptographicLength
Antisocial TourOperations are safe out of documented orderEncrypt with a PreActive key; decrypt with a Deactivated key; destroy a key then try to export it; revoke access then try to use the key through the revoked user; call Certify on a symmetric key
Time TourTime-dependent behavior is correct at boundariesCreate a key with expiry 1 second from now, wait, then try to encrypt; rotate a key at the exact moment a wrap request arrives; check unwrapped_cache_max_age eviction timing
Obsessive TourRepeated operations don't degrade stateCreate 100 keys with the same tag; rotate the same key 50 times in a loop; grant+revoke access 100 times; send 100 concurrent encrypt requests on the same key
Configuration TourNon-default configs don't break invariantsRun with clear_database = true; run with a custom kmip_policy restricting key sizes; run with force_default_username; switch database backends mid-session
Amnesia TourRestart/crash recovery preserves guaranteesKill the KMS mid-encrypt; restart; verify key state is consistent; verify no partial objects in DB; verify the health endpoint comes back UP with correct DB status
Privilege TourAccess control is not bypassable at edgesCall admin-only endpoints (/access/grant) without auth; with no_auth.toml, verify default_username is used; test non_revocable_key_id enforcement; grant access to a key, destroy the key, check the access entry is cleaned up
Feature-Flag TourFIPS/non-FIPS boundaries are enforcedIn FIPS mode, attempt to create a Covercrypt key (should fail); in non-FIPS mode, attempt to use the /tokenize/ endpoints (should work); verify that server-info reports the correct fips_mode

For each tour relevant to the PR's diff, produce a concrete sequence of test steps using whichever channel from §1 is most direct for the surface being tested:

  • ckms CLI commands for KMIP-visible behavior and key lifecycle
  • curl calls for HTTP endpoints (JOSE REST, JWKS, enterprise integrations, tokenize)
  • Chrome DevTools MCP for UI behavior or WASM-backed operations
  • cargo test -p <crate> or in-process test server for database backends, PKCS#11, or crypto primitives

Choose the channel that most closely matches how a real user would reach the broken assumption.

Example: Antisocial Tour for a key lifecycle PR

# Create a key (starts in PreActive state — no auto-activation unless configured)
KEY_ID=$(cargo run -p ckms --features non-fips -- sym keys create --algorithm aes --number-of-bits 256 2>&1 | grep -oP '[0-9a-f-]{36}')

# Try to encrypt before activation — should fail if key is PreActive
cargo run -p ckms --features non-fips -- sym encrypt -k "$KEY_ID" test_data/plain.txt
# Expected: error mentioning key state or usage mask

# Destroy the key
cargo run -p ckms --features non-fips -- objects destroy -k "$KEY_ID"

# Try to export the destroyed key — must fail
cargo run -p ckms --features non-fips -- sym keys export -k "$KEY_ID" /tmp/dead-key.json
# Expected: error "Item not found" or "object is destroyed"

6 — SFDIPOT Canary Checklist

After tours, run a canary pass. For each dimension touched by the PR, write one cheap verification.

DimensionKMS-specific probesCanary command
StructureKey object schema, KMIP message framing, TTLV field orderingcurl -s -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{}' http://127.0.0.1:9998/kmip/2_1 → expect 422 with KMIP error, not 500
FunctionCore KMIP: Create, Get, Activate, Revoke, Destroy, Encrypt, Decrypt, Wrap, Unwrap, Sign, Verify, MAC, Hash, Locate, Certify, Validate, DeriveKey, Import, Export, ReKeycargo run -p ckms --features non-fips -- server version → expect version string
DataKey material encoding, algorithm identifiers, length constraints, empty/null inputs, Unicode in tagscargo run -p ckms --features non-fips -- sym keys create --algorithm aes --number-of-bits 128 --tag "canary-αβγ" → expect success
InterfaceHTTP REST endpoints, KMIP TTLV, CLI flags, TLS cert validation, CORS headers, cookie handlingcurl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" http://127.0.0.1:9998/health → expect 200
PlatformLinux (primary), macOS, Windows (CI), Docker, Nix packagingCheck binary starts: cargo run -p cosmian_kms_server --features non-fips -- --help → expect help text
OperationsStartup, shutdown, config reload, log output, OTEL metrics, concurrent requests, DB migrationsCheck health with DB: curl -s http://127.0.0.1:9998/health | jq .dependencies.database.status → expect "UP"
TimeKey validity windows, expiry, rotation scheduling, cache TTLs (unwrapped_cache_max_age), session cookie TTLCreate key with activation/expiry dates, verify enforcement

7 — Regression Oracle Pass

For every behavioral change the PR introduces, identify the adjacent behaviors that were not changed but could have been silently affected. For each:

  • State the invariant (from the KMS domain invariants list below)
  • Write the minimal verification
  • Note whether the expected response is deterministic

Example regression checks:

Scenario: Destroyed keys cannot be retrieved
  Given a KMS with a symmetric AES-256 key that has been destroyed
  When the user runs `cargo run -p ckms --features non-fips -- sym keys export -k <destroyed-key-id> /tmp/out.json`
  Then the command fails with "Item not found" error
  And the exit code is non-zero

Scenario: Key material never appears in error messages
  Given a KMS with a symmetric key
  When the user sends a malformed encrypt request referencing that key
  Then the error response body does not contain any base64-encoded key material
  And the server log does not contain key bytes

Scenario: Health endpoint reflects actual DB state
  Given a KMS running with SQLite backend
  When the SQLite file is deleted while the server is running
  Then GET /health returns {"status":"DOWN",...} or reports database error

8 — KMS Error Reference

HTTP status mapping, KMIP ResultReason codes, and enterprise error formats → reference/error-codes.md


9 — KMS Domain Invariants

Any scenario that violates one of these is a critical finding.

Full invariant list (key lifecycle, security, access control, protocol, concurrency, JOSE/JWKS) → reference/invariants.md


10 — Feature Flag Awareness

The tester agent must be aware of which feature flags are active and test accordingly.

FlagAlgorithms/features enabledHow to detect
FIPS (default)AES, RSA ≥2048, ECDSA, EdDSA, ML-KEM, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA, SHA-2/3, HMACcurl -s http://127.0.0.1:9998/server-info | jq .fips_mode → true
non-fipsAll FIPS + ChaCha20, AES-XTS, Covercrypt, FPE, tokenize, Redis-Findex, MD5, SHA-1curl -s http://127.0.0.1:9998/server-info | jq .fips_mode → false

JOSE REST API feature-flag specifics:

  • All /v1/crypto/* endpoints are available in both FIPS and non-FIPS builds.
  • kty=OKP (Ed25519/EdDSA) key creation and signing is gated behind non-fips. In a FIPS build, POST /v1/crypto/keys with kty=OKP must return 400 Bad Request.
  • /.well-known/jwks.json is always compiled in but only registered when jwks_endpoint_enabled = true. Feature flag does not affect this — it is a runtime config toggle.

Testing rule: If the PR introduces code guarded by #[cfg(feature = "non-fips")], the tester must verify:

  1. The feature works when non-fips is enabled
  2. The feature is unreachable (compile-gated) when building without it — this is verified by cargo build (no --features non-fips)

11 — KMIP Operations & Test Configurations

Full dispatch table (all 31 operations, handlers, notes) and server config reference → reference/kmip-ops-and-configs.md


12 — Workflow Checklist

Copy and track progress for each PR review:

PR Review Progress:
- [ ] A: KMS server running on port 9998 (health check green)
- [ ] A: Chrome DevTools MCP available (if PR touches UI)
- [ ] A: Test channels identified (CLI / HTTP / UI / Other)
- [ ] B: git diff read; ACC risk map built (Attributes × Components)
- [ ] B: Behavioral diff questions answered (§4)
- [ ] C: Relevant tours selected and run (§5)
- [ ] C: SFDIPOT canaries executed for touched dimensions (§6)
- [ ] C: Regression invariants checked (§7, reference/invariants.md)
- [ ] E: Finding report written (see template below)

13 — Finding Report Template

# PR Finding Report — <PR title / branch>

## Server
- Mode: FIPS / non-FIPS
- Config: <config file used>
- Version: <curl http://127.0.0.1:9998/version>

## Channels tested
- [ ] CLI
- [ ] HTTP
- [ ] Web UI
- [ ] Other: ___

## ACC risk map (high-risk cells only)
| Attribute | Component | Risk | Tested? |
|-----------|-----------|------|---------|
| ...       | ...       | H/M/L| Y/N     |

## Tours run
| Tour | Findings |
|------|----------|
| ...  | ...      |

## SFDIPOT canaries
| Dimension | Result |
|-----------|--------|
| ...       | PASS / FAIL |

## Invariant regressions
- [ ] No invariants violated
- [ ] Violations: <describe>

## Verdict
**GO / NO-GO** — <one sentence summary>

14 — Literature and References

ResourceWhat to extract
James Whittaker, Exploratory Software Testing (2009)Tour metaphors: Saboteur, Antisocial, Obsessive, Configuration, Time tours
James Whittaker, ACC framework (Google)Attributes/Components/Capabilities matrix for rapid risk mapping
SFDIPOT heuristic (Satisfice / RST)Seven-dimension checklist: Structure, Function, Data, Interface, Platform, Operations, Time
Michael Bolton & James Bach — Rapid Software TestingOracles vs. exploration distinction; error guessing with domain priors
KMIP 2.1 specification (HTML files in crate/kmip/src/)Normative reference for all KMIP operations, object types, attributes
FIPS 140-3 / NIST SP 800-175BApproved algorithms, key management requirements
Cosmian KMS AGENTS.mdCanonical project instructions, build commands, CI workflows
test_data/configs/server/All available server configurations for different test scenarios