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T1070.007_clear-network-connection-history-and-configurations

DevOps & Security

Adversaries may clear or remove evidence of malicious network connections in order to clean up traces of their operations.

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Inspect the Agent Skill at https://github.com/CyberStrikeus/CyberStrike/blob/HEAD/.cyberstrike/skill/mitre_attack/TA0005_defense-evasion/T1070.007_clear-network-connection-history-and-configurations/SKILL.md and all supporting files. Report provenance, permissions, scripts, dependencies, and security risks. Propose an exact installation into .agents/skills/t1070-007-clear-network-connection-history-and-configurations, but wait for my approval before writing files or running scripts.

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T1070.007 Clear Network Connection History and Configurations

Sub-technique of: T1070

High-Level Description

Adversaries may clear or remove evidence of malicious network connections in order to clean up traces of their operations. Configuration settings as well as various artifacts that highlight connection history may be created on a system and/or in application logs from behaviors that require network connections, such as Remote Services or External Remote Services. Defenders may use these artifacts to monitor or otherwise analyze network connections created by adversaries.

Network connection history may be stored in various locations. For example, RDP connection history may be stored in Windows Registry values under :

  • HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Terminal Server Client\Default
  • HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Terminal Server Client\Servers

Windows may also store information about recent RDP connections in files such as C:\Users\%username%\Documents\Default.rdp and C:\Users\%username%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Terminal Server Client\Cache\. Similarly, macOS and Linux hosts may store information highlighting connection history in system logs (such as those stored in /Library/Logs and/or /var/log/).

Malicious network connections may also require changes to third-party applications or network configuration settings, such as Disable or Modify System Firewall or tampering to enable Proxy. Adversaries may delete or modify this data to conceal indicators and/or impede defensive analysis.

Kill Chain Phase

  • Defense Evasion (TA0005)

Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows, Network Devices

What to Check

  • Identify if Clear Network Connection History and Configurations technique is applicable to target environment
  • Check Linux systems for indicators of Clear Network Connection History and Configurations
  • Check macOS systems for indicators of Clear Network Connection History and Configurations
  • Check Windows systems for indicators of Clear Network Connection History and Configurations
  • Verify mitigations are bypassed or absent (2 known mitigations)
  • Assess detection coverage (1 detection strategies)

How to Test

Manual Testing

  1. Identify Attack Surface: Determine if the target environment is susceptible to Clear Network Connection History and Configurations by examining the target platforms (Linux, macOS, Windows).

  2. Assess Existing Defenses: Review whether mitigations for T1070.007 are in place. If defenses are absent or misconfigured, this technique may be exploitable.

  3. Execute Test: Use tools and methods described in the MITRE ATT&CK page and external references below.

Note: No Atomic Red Team tests available for this technique. See Atomic Red Team GitHub for updates.

Remediation Guide

M1029 Remote Data Storage

Automatically forward events to a log server or data repository to prevent conditions in which the adversary can locate and manipulate data on the local system. When possible, minimize time delay on event reporting to avoid prolonged storage on the local system.

M1024 Restrict Registry Permissions

Protect generated event files and logs that are stored locally with proper permissions and authentication and limit opportunities for adversaries to increase privileges by preventing Privilege Escalation opportunities.

Detection

Behavioral Detection of Network History and Configuration Tampering

Risk Assessment

FindingSeverityImpact
Clear Network Connection History and Configurations technique applicableMediumDefense Evasion

CWE Categories

CWE IDTitle
CWE-693Protection Mechanism Failure

References