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java-deserialization-methodology

DevOps & Security
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Java 反序列化漏洞检测与利用。当目标是 Java 应用(Tomcat/Spring/WebLogic/JBoss/Jenkins)、发现 rO0AB/aced0005 开头的 Base64 数据、HTTP 请求中有 application/x-java-serialized-object Content-Type、或存在 T3/IIOP/RMI/JNDI 协议端口时使用。覆盖 ysoserial gadget chain、JNDI 注入、Fastjson/Jackson 反序列化、Shiro rememberMe、常见中间件 CVE 利用

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Java 反序列化漏洞方法论

Java 反序列化是 Java 生态中最危险的漏洞类之一——一旦成功通常直接 RCE。

⛔ 深入参考(必读)


Phase 1: 识别 Java 反序列化入口

1.1 原生 Java 序列化数据(魔术字节)

  • 二进制:\xac\xed\x00\x05(hex: aced0005)
  • Base64 编码后:以 rO0AB 开头
  • Gzip 压缩后再 Base64:以 H4sIAAAA 开头

检查位置:Cookie(rememberMe/VIEWSTATE)、POST Body、自定义 Header、WebSocket、RMI/T3/IIOP 协议端口

1.2 JSON 反序列化(Fastjson/Jackson)

  • Fastjson:JSON 中含 @type 字段 → references/jndi-fastjson.md
  • Jackson:启用了 DefaultTyping → JSON 中含类名数组 ["com.xxx.Class", {...}]
  • 识别:发送畸形 JSON 观察错误堆栈中的库名

1.3 特定中间件端口

端口服务漏洞方向
7001/7002WebLogicT3/IIOP 反序列化
8009AJP (Tomcat)GhostCat (CVE-2020-1938)
1099RMI RegistryRMI 反序列化
1090/8500JBoss JMXJMXInvokerServlet
50000JenkinsJenkins CLI 反序列化

Phase 2: 利用决策树

发现序列化入口
├─ 原生序列化 (rO0AB/aced0005)?
│   ├─ 先 URLDNS 确认漏洞存在 → [references/ysoserial-gadgets.md](references/ysoserial-gadgets.md)
│   └─ 逐个尝试 CC1-7 → CommonsBeanutils → Spring → Groovy
├─ Fastjson (@type 字段)?
│   └─ 识别版本 → 选择对应 payload → [references/jndi-fastjson.md](references/jndi-fastjson.md)
├─ Shiro (rememberMe=deleteMe)?
│   └─ 默认密钥 kPH+bIxk5D2deZiIxcaaaA== → [references/jndi-fastjson.md](references/jndi-fastjson.md)
└─ Log4j (Java 应用 + 用户输入)?
    └─ ${jndi:ldap://...} → [references/jndi-fastjson.md](references/jndi-fastjson.md)

注意事项

  • 先用 URLDNS 检测,确认漏洞存在后再尝试命令执行 gadget
  • ysoserial 的 Runtime.exec() 不支持管道/重定向,需要 Base64 编码命令
  • Java 版本影响 JNDI 利用方式(JDK < 8u191 最简单,8u191+ 需本地 Gadget)
  • 多个 gadget chain 逐一尝试,不同 classpath 环境适用不同 gadget