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ics-overview

DevOps & Security
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Use when the target is an industrial control system or operational technology network running Modbus, BACnet, S7Comm/S7Comm Plus, DNP3, OPC-UA, or any PLC/HMI/SCADA stack. Engagements MUST set RoE flag industrial_safety_critical=true; this catalog gates every write-scope operation behind explicit operator confirmation regardless of HITL middleware.

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How to use this skill

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Source SKILL.md: https://github.com/PurpleAILAB/Decepticon/blob/HEAD/packages/decepticon/decepticon/skills/standard/ics/SKILL.md

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ICS / OT Operator Skill Catalog

Industrial engagements are not application security with longer rules of engagement — they are a different discipline. A miswritten Modbus coil on a real plant kills people. This catalog is read-mostly by default; every write-scope skill carries an explicit safety gate.

Hard rules

  1. No writes without OPPLAN.safety_critical confirmation. The middleware refuses writes when the active OPPLAN objective does not carry safety_critical_confirmed=true. Bypass requires operator signature in /workspace/safety-attestation.txt.
  2. Read-only protocol discovery first. Identify what's on the wire before any active probing. Many ICS protocols are unauthenticated; a single malformed read can crash an old PLC.
  3. Out-of-band physical safety. The blue team includes plant ops. A ConOps with blue_team.plant_ops_phone is mandatory for engagements on active production lines.

Playbooks

Inline technique reference — not separately loadable skills. The entries below are summarized here for direct use; there is no separate SKILL.md to open for each. Do NOT call the skill loader on them — apply the technique with your tools using this summary and the Workflow in this file.

TechniqueUse for
modbus-discoveryRead-only Modbus TCP/RTU enumeration, function code 3/4 polling
modbus-writeGATED Write coils / registers; safety gate enforced
bacnet-discoveryBACnet/IP Who-Is, object enumeration, device profile
s7commSiemens S7 / S7Comm Plus enumeration via Snap7 / python-snap7
dnp3DNP3 outstation / master discovery; integrity poll
opcuaOPC-UA browse, anonymous auth check, certificate analysis
hmi-webHMI web stacks (Wonderware, Iconics, Schneider) — known CVEs
engineering-softwareTIA Portal / Studio 5000 / Unity Pro project extraction

Workflow

  1. Passive observation: tap a SPAN port if available. Identify protocols on the wire (tshark -Y modbus || tshark -Y bacnet || ...).
  2. Network-layer discovery: nmap with -sV --script modbus-discover, bacnet-info, s7-info, dnp3-info (NSE scripts ship in Kali by default; some are slow — set -T2 for production networks).
  3. Function-code-3 polling: read holding registers from every Modbus device discovered. Log register maps to the knowledge graph as :Service nodes with protocol=modbus.
  4. Identify the safety integrity level (SIL) of any device touched. SIL 3+ devices NEVER get write probes without plant-ops sign-off.
  5. Engineering software attack path: if you can reach the engineering workstation, extract the project archive (.s7p, .acd, .stp). The project file is the crown jewel — it reveals the entire process model.

Detection gap

ICS networks rarely have host-based detection on PLCs/RTUs themselves — the detection stack lives on the engineering workstation, the historian, and any IT/OT gateway. Detector agent should generate Sigma rules targeting:

  • Function-code anomalies (write to coils outside normal ranges).
  • Connection sources outside the documented MES/SCADA IP set.
  • TIA Portal / Studio 5000 project download events.

Out of scope by default

Active glitching of PLC firmware; firmware upload to PLCs; safety controller writes — all of these require an explicit RoE annex signed by the asset owner. The default ICS RoE template in soundwave/ includes this annex skeleton.