debug-node
DevOps & SecurityUse when a Hetzner node is unreachable, SSH fails, cloud-init seems broken, or provisioning hangs. Boots into rescue mode via hcloud CLI to inspect filesystem, logs, SSH keys, sshd config, and cloud-init state without needing SSH access to the node itself.
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Debug Hetzner Node via Rescue Console
Overview
When a Hetzner Cloud server is unreachable (SSH hangs, provisioning stuck, cloud-init failure), this skill uses Hetzner's rescue mode to mount the node's filesystem and inspect everything from the outside — no working SSH required.
Usage
/debug-node
When invoked, ask for:
- The server name or IP (can be found from
hcloud server list) - What symptom they're seeing (SSH timeout, provisioning hang, etc.)
Prerequisites
hcloudCLI installed and configured with a valid token- The server must exist in Hetzner Cloud
hcloud server list
Leap Micro Filesystem Model
Leap Micro uses a transactional-update system on btrfs. This is the mental model for everything below.
| Layer | Writable? | Persists reboot? | Persists Hetzner snapshot? |
|---|---|---|---|
/usr (snapshot) | No (read-only) | Yes | Yes |
/etc via transactional-update shell | Yes (new snapshot) | Yes (after reboot) | Yes |
/etc via direct edit on running system | Yes (volatile overlay) | No | No |
/var (separate subvolume) | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Rule: Any /etc change that must survive MUST go through transactional-update --continue shell.
Packer build phases:
- Rescue mode: Write qcow2 to disk, reboot
install_packages: Insidetransactional-update— changes persistclean_up: Volatile overlay —/etcchanges are lost in the Hetzner snapshot
Step 1: Identify the Server
hcloud server list -o columns=id,name,status,ipv4 | grep <pattern>
Step 2: Enable Rescue Mode & Reboot
hcloud server enable-rescue <SERVER_ID> --type linux64
hcloud server reboot <SERVER_ID>
sleep 30
Save the rescue root password from the output (usually key auth works, but just in case).
Step 3: SSH into Rescue
ssh -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -o UserKnownHostsFile=/dev/null root@<SERVER_IP>
Step 4: Mount the Filesystem
Leap Micro / MicroOS (btrfs)
# Mount btrfs top-level
mount -o subvolid=5 /dev/sda3 /mnt
# List snapshots — highest number is active
ls /mnt/@/.snapshots/
Layout:
/mnt/@/.snapshots/N/snapshot/ latest active snapshot — /etc lives here
/mnt/@/root/ /root home (/root/.ssh/authorized_keys)
/mnt/@/var/ /var (logs, cloud-init state, journal)
Key: /etc is inside the snapshot. /var and /root are separate subvolumes at @/var and @/root.
Unsupported/custom ext4 images
mount /dev/sda1 /mnt
Step 5: Diagnostic Checklist
Set this once and use throughout:
SNAP=/mnt/@/.snapshots/N/snapshot # replace N with highest snapshot number
5a. Cloud-Init Status
Start here — most provisioning failures trace back to cloud-init.
cat /mnt/@/var/lib/cloud/data/result.json
cat /mnt/@/var/lib/cloud/data/status.json
cat /mnt/@/var/lib/cloud/instance/datasource
# What Terraform actually sent
cat /mnt/@/var/lib/cloud/instance/user-data.txt
zcat /mnt/@/var/lib/cloud/instance/user-data.txt.i 2>/dev/null
# Logs
tail -100 /mnt/@/var/log/cloud-init.log
tail -100 /mnt/@/var/log/cloud-init-output.log
Expected: DataSourceHetzner, no errors.
Watch for: Skipping modules — means cloud-init already ran for this instance-id.
Cloud-init facts on Hetzner + Leap Micro:
- Datasource:
DataSourceHetzner(metadata API) - Terraform's
cloudinit_config→ gzip+base64 multipart MIME →user_data disable_root: falseprevents cloud-init from disabling root but does NOT unlock a locked accountssh_authorized_keyswrites keys to/root/.ssh/authorized_keys
5b. SSH Keys
cat /mnt/@/root/.ssh/authorized_keys
Compare with your local pubkey. If missing, cloud-init failed to inject — check 5a logs.
5c. SSHD Configuration
Config loading order (first match wins):
1. /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/40-kube-hetzner-authorized-keys-command.conf
2. /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/50-cloud-init.conf
3. /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/kube-hetzner.conf (MaxAuthTries 2)
4. /usr/etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/40-suse-crypto-policies.conf
5. /usr/etc/ssh/sshd_config (UsePAM yes)
ls $SNAP/etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/
cat $SNAP/etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/*.conf
cat $SNAP/usr/etc/ssh/sshd_config
ls -la $SNAP/etc/ssh/ssh_host_*
5d. Account Status
grep '^root:' $SNAP/etc/shadow
| Pattern | Meaning | SSH pubkey works? |
|---|---|---|
root:*:... | Unlocked, no password | Yes |
root:!*:... or root:!:... | Locked | No (PAM rejects with UsePAM yes) |
This is fixed in packer (usermod -p '*' root inside transactional-update) with a cloud-init bootcmd safety net. If you see a locked account on a fresh node, the packer snapshot needs rebuilding.
5e. Journal Logs
journalctl -D /mnt/@/var/log/journal/ -u sshd --no-pager | tail -50
journalctl -D /mnt/@/var/log/journal/ -u k3s --no-pager | tail -30
journalctl -D /mnt/@/var/log/journal/ -u rke2-server --no-pager | tail -30
journalctl -D /mnt/@/var/log/journal/ -u rke2-agent --no-pager | tail -30
5f. Network
ls $SNAP/etc/NetworkManager/system-connections/
cat $SNAP/etc/NetworkManager/system-connections/*.nmconnection 2>/dev/null
5g. Kubernetes
cat $SNAP/etc/rancher/k3s/config.yaml 2>/dev/null
cat $SNAP/etc/rancher/rke2/config.yaml 2>/dev/null
cat /mnt/@/var/lib/rancher/k3s/server/token 2>/dev/null
5h. SELinux
cat $SNAP/etc/selinux/config
chroot $SNAP rpm -qa | grep -iE 'selinux|k3s|rke2'
grep -i 'avc:.*denied' /mnt/@/var/log/audit/audit.log | tail -50
journalctl -D /mnt/@/var/log/journal/ --no-pager | grep -i 'avc:.*denied' | tail -50
For workload denials, follow docs/selinux.md: collect the AVC lines,
workload name/version, k3s/RKE2 distribution, OS image, and udica result before
proposing upstream policy changes. Do not globally disable SELinux as the first
answer; use per-pool selinux = false only as the last resort for a workload or
nodepool that cannot run under policy.
Step 6: Apply a Fix
Edit files in the active snapshot ($SNAP), not in @/ base.
# Unlock root account (if locked)
sed -i 's/^root:!*/root:*/' $SNAP/etc/shadow
# Fix authorized_keys
mkdir -p /mnt/@/root/.ssh
echo "ssh-ed25519 AAAA..." > /mnt/@/root/.ssh/authorized_keys
chmod 700 /mnt/@/root/.ssh && chmod 600 /mnt/@/root/.ssh/authorized_keys
# Regenerate host keys
mount --bind /proc $SNAP/proc && mount --bind /sys $SNAP/sys && mount --bind /dev $SNAP/dev
chroot $SNAP ssh-keygen -A
umount $SNAP/proc $SNAP/sys $SNAP/dev
Note: Rescue-mode edits are immediate fixes. The proper long-term fix belongs in the packer template or cloud-init.
Step 7: Reboot to Normal
umount /mnt 2>/dev/null
exit
hcloud server disable-rescue <SERVER_ID>
hcloud server reboot <SERVER_ID>
sleep 60
ssh -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -o IdentitiesOnly=yes -i ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 root@<SERVER_IP> 'echo ok'
Common Diagnoses
| Symptom | Likely Cause | Check | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| SSH timeout | Firewall or network | Hetzner firewall rules | Open port 22 |
| SSH "Connection refused" | sshd not running | Journal logs | Fix sshd config syntax |
| SSH key rejected | Keys not injected | authorized_keys empty | Check cloud-init logs |
| SSH "Too many auth failures" | Agent offers too many keys | MaxAuthTries 2 | Use -o IdentitiesOnly=yes |
| SSH "unable to authenticate" | Root locked, or key mismatch | /etc/shadow, authorized_keys | Rebuild packer snapshot |
| Provisioner hangs "Still creating" | SSH can't connect | All above | Fix underlying SSH issue |
| Cloud-init skips modules | Already ran for instance-id | cloud-init.log | Clean /var/lib/cloud/instance |
| k3s/rke2 not starting | Config or SELinux | Journal + audit.log | Fix config or policy |
| Workload denied by SELinux | Missing workload policy | AVC lines in audit/journal | Follow docs/selinux.md; try udica before disabling a pool |
| Network/subnet destroy hangs | Autoscaler-created server outside Terraform state | hcloud server list for cluster-name or kh-ci-* leftovers | Delete only after control plane is dead, or scale autoscaler min_nodes = 0 first |
/etc change vanished | Edited outside transactional-update | Check packer phase | Move change to phase 2 |
Debugging SSH Manually
# Verbose with specific key (avoids agent key spray hitting MaxAuthTries 2)
ssh -vvv -o IdentitiesOnly=yes -i ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 root@<SERVER_IP>
# In -vvv output:
# "Offering public key: ..." → key was offered
# "Server accepts key: ..." → success path
# "Authentications that can continue: ..." → key was REJECTED
# "Too many authentication failures" → agent sent too many keys
Pro Tips
- Mount with
subvolid=5— gets the real btrfs root, navigate to@/.snapshots/N/snapshot/ - Highest snapshot = active — that's where
/etclives /varis separate — logs and cloud-init are at/mnt/@/var/, not inside the snapshot- Journal without a running system —
journalctl -D /path/to/journal/ - Use
-o IdentitiesOnly=yes— kube-hetzner setsMaxAuthTries 2 - Volatile overlay trap — if rescue shows different content than the live system did, it was running on a volatile overlay that never got committed
- After fixing packer, rebuild snapshots — verify build logs show changes inside the
transactional-updateoutput - Rescue mode is non-destructive — you're just reading/writing files on the disk
- Destroy with the wrapper — for full-cluster teardown, run
scripts/destroy.shfrom the Terraform root; it retries only the known ingress-LB detach race and prints a read-only orphan report. Usescripts/cleanup.shonly as the forceful fallback.