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configuration-authorization

DevOps & Security
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caddy-security authorization policy Caddyfile configuration. Use when creating, reviewing, or modifying security authorization policy blocks, route-level authorize directives, ACL rules, allow or deny shortcuts, bypass rules, crypto verification keys, auth redirects, bearer token validation, basic or API key auth proxy settings, user identity fields, and injected claim headers.

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Configuration Authorization

Purpose

Use this skill to configure authorization policy <name> blocks and the route-level authorize [<matcher>] with <policy> handler.

Use configuration-http-integrations for route placement, matcher forms, same-host or split-host auth wiring, portal/protected route separation, and directive-order guardrails when attaching a policy to HTTP routes.

Use configuration-crypto for detailed policy crypto key syntax, token verification material, token names and lifetimes, auto-generated key behavior, secret-backed key material, and System API system keys for remote Basic or API-key auth.

Read these files when details matter:

  • caddyfile_authz.go for the policy block.
  • caddyfile_authz_acl.go and caddyfile_authz_acl_shortcuts.go for ACLs.
  • caddyfile_authz_bypass.go for bypass rules.
  • caddyfile_authz_crypto.go for token verification keys.
  • caddyfile_authz_inject.go for claim header injection.
  • caddyfile_authz_misc.go for enable, disable, validate, set, and with.
  • plugin_authz.go for route-level authorize syntax.
  • ../go-authcrunch/pkg/authz/config.go and gatekeeper.go for policy defaults and runtime wiring.
  • ../go-authcrunch/pkg/authz/validator/ for token source, bearer, method/path, path-ACL, source-address, Basic, and API-key behavior.
  • ../go-authcrunch/pkg/acl/ for ACL fields, aliases, match strategies, and action semantics.

Shape

security {
	authorization policy app_policy {
		crypto key verify {env.JWT_SHARED_KEY}
		set auth url /auth
		allow roles authp/admin authp/user
	}
}

example.com {
	route /app* {
		authorize with app_policy
		reverse_proxy 127.0.0.1:8080
	}
}

The policy name must match the authorize with <policy> reference. Put auth proxy settings inside the policy block, not inside a block under the route-level authorize directive. The current route parser only reads the directive arguments.

Runtime Defaults

An authorization policy must have a name and at least one ACL rule. When no crypto key ... entries are present, go-authcrunch auto-generates an ES512 sign-verify key with token name access_token and lifetime 900; for real portal-issued tokens, configure compatible verification material explicitly. When explicit key entries are present, at least one key must be verify or sign-verify.

Defaults applied by PolicyConfig.Validate() and Gatekeeper.configure():

  • auth URL: /auth
  • auth redirect query parameter: redirect_url
  • auth redirect status: 302
  • token source priority: cookie, header, query
  • token names in cookies, auth headers, and query params: access_token, jwt_access_token
  • API key header: X-Api-Key
  • auth realm header: X-Auth-Realm

Use set token sources only with cookie, header, and query; the order is the lookup priority. validate bearer header enables Authorization: Bearer <token> parsing but is not itself a token source name.

ACLs

Prefer concise shortcuts for common role, origin, issuer, method, and path matches:

allow roles authp/admin authp/user
allow roles authp/guest with get to /public
deny iss untrusted

Shortcut behavior is not just syntax sugar:

  • allow <field> <values...> becomes allow log debug; it does not stop later rules.
  • deny <field> <values...> becomes deny stop log warn.
  • <field> any or <field> * becomes field <field> exists.
  • with <method> to <path> uppercases the method, adds a partial match path condition, and enables method/path validation.

Use explicit ACL rules when comments, actions, or multiple conditions matter:

acl rule {
	comment allow users
	match role authp/user
	allow stop log info
}

acl default deny

Explicit rule conditions use go-authcrunch ACL grammar:

match any
match roles authp/admin authp/user
partial match email @example.com
no regex match issuer ^https://untrusted
field origin exists
field picture not exists

Supported match strategies are exact (default), partial, prefix, suffix, and regex; prefix with no for negative matches. Field aliases include role, group, and groups for roles; issuer for iss; subject for sub; mail for email; scope for scopes; organization for org; address, ip, and ipv4 for addr; http_method for method; and http_path for path.

Explicit actions must start with allow or deny, and may include any, stop, log [debug|info|warn|error], counter, and tag <value>. With multiple conditions, the default is match-all; add any to the action for match-any. A matched deny denies immediately. A matched allow grants access only if no later deny overrides it, unless stop is used.

Policy Options

Use set auth url for the login redirect target and set forbidden url for authorization failures:

set auth url /auth
set forbidden url /forbidden
set redirect query parameter redirect_url
set redirect status 302
set user identity id
set token sources header query cookie
set session_id cookie name AUTHP_SESSION_ID
set access_token cookie name AUTHP_ACCESS_TOKEN ALT_ACCESS_TOKEN

set auth url must match where the referenced authentication portal is served. Use the same-host portal path such as /auth or /xauth, or the full URL for a split-host or root-mounted dedicated auth host. Use configuration-http-integrations to choose and align the route shape.

set redirect status accepts only 300 through 308. When set forbidden url is present, access-denied decisions redirect with status 303; {uri}, {http.request.uri}, and {url} placeholders are replaced at request time.

Use validation and behavior toggles deliberately:

validate bearer header
validate path acl
validate source address
enable js redirect
enable strip token
enable login hint
enable login hint with email phone
enable additional scopes
disable auth redirect query
disable auth redirect

validate path acl also enables method/path ACL evaluation. Path ACL claims are matched against the request path using exact matching or * and ** wildcards. validate source address compares the token address claim to the request source address. enable strip token removes only cookie-sourced auth tokens from the upstream request.

For API key or basic auth proxying, configure a portal and realm:

with basic auth portal myportal realm local
with api key auth portal myportal realm local
with api key header name X-Api-Key
with auth realm header name X-Auth-Realm

Basic/API-key auth is consulted after normal token sources fail. The request realm must match with auth realm header name, defaulting to X-Auth-Realm; failed Basic or API-key auth returns 401.

Client checks for Basic and API-key auth:

curl -H 'X-Auth-Realm: local' --user 'jsmith:My@Password123' https://app.example.com/api/foo
curl -H 'X-Auth-Realm: local' -H 'X-Api-Key: <api-key>' https://app.example.com/api/foo

If clients cannot send X-Auth-Realm, set a default before authorize with Caddy's request_header directive:

route /api/* {
	request_header +X-Auth-Realm "local"
	authorize with api_policy
}

A malformed API key or failed Basic credential should return 401. If the API key header name is wrong or absent, the policy may treat the request like an unauthenticated browser request and redirect to the auth URL unless disable auth redirect is set. For multiple realms, configure one with basic auth portal ... realm ... or with api key auth portal ... realm ... line per accepted realm and require clients to send the matching realm header.

Bypass authorization only for paths that do not need authenticated user metadata:

bypass uri exact /healthz
bypass uri prefix /assets/
bypass uri regex ^/public/.*

Bypass match types are exact, partial, prefix, suffix, and regex, and they match r.URL.Path.

Inject claims only when an upstream explicitly expects them:

inject headers with claims
inject header "X-User-Email" from email

inject headers with claims sets default X-Token-* headers for name, email, roles, and subject. Custom inject header entries map a header name to a claim field and are applied only after a user is authorized.

Fixtures

Use these examples:

  • caddyfile_authz_test.go for detailed ACL and misc behavior.
  • testdata/caddyfile_adapt/testcase_authorize_ok.Caddyfile.
  • testdata/caddyfile_adapt/testcase_authenticate_with_oauth.Caddyfile.