cis-bind-v100-2-9
DevOps & SecurityIsolate BIND with chroot'ed Subdirectory (Automated)
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CIS 2.9 — Isolate BIND with chroot'ed Subdirectory
Profile Applicability
- Caching Only Name Server Level 2
- Authoritative Name Server Level 2
Description
The chroot() system call causes an application to run with limited file system access so that a subdirectory becomes the root directory for the application environment. When this is done, the application is "jailed" and no longer has access to the entire file structure but is limited to the given subdirectory.
The chroot'd subdirectory and the recommendations in section "Enable SELinux to Restrict BIND Processes" provide similar controls, in that the DNS service is prevented from accessing and modifying inappropriate files. SELinux goes well beyond what the chroot is able to prevent, however for audit purposes either control, the chroot'd subdirectory or the SELinux in enforcing mode is sufficient.
Rationale
Although there are ways that a chroot jail can be broken, most methods require that a process be running as root in order to escape. Since BIND should be run as a different user than root, a chroot is an effective defense, to limit access to sensitive system configuration files. In the event that BIND has a vulnerability that allows code execution, the attack will not have access to the real system files such as /etc/password, but will be limited to the files placed in the chroot subdirectory.
Impact
Not specified.
Audit Procedure
Run the following two commands to find the root directory of the currently running named process. If the named process is chroot'ed, then the listing will show a symbolic link to the chroot subdirectory. If process is not chroot'ed, then the symbolic link will point to the real root directory /.
# NAMEDPID=$(pidof named)
# ls -ld /proc/$NAMEDPID/root
lrwxrwxrwx 1 named named 0 Sep 10 13:21 /proc/423/root -> /var/named/chroot
Note: SELinux in enforcing mode may be used as an audit alternative to the chroot'd subdirectory.
Remediation
Perform the following:
- Stop the named service and install the
bind-chrootpackage to provide thechrootdirectories.
# systemctl stop named.service
# yum install bind-chroot
- Edit the
/etc/sysconfig/namedconfiguration file to have a line similar to the one shown below that sets theROOTDIRenvironment variable.
ROOTDIR="/var/named/chroot"
- Move all the configuration files and any master zone files into their respective directions under the subdirectory
/var/named/chroot/ - It may be helpful to create symbolic links from a couple of system
/etcfiles such as/etc/named.confand/etc/rndc.keyto the real files in thechroot'ed subdirectory, so that utilities likerndcwill work as expected. Do not create symbolic links or hard links from inside the chroot to external resources! Instead use symbolic links to point from the outside resources into thechroot. - Restart the named service and test the configuration.
# systemctl start named.service
Default Value
The BIND service is not chroot'ed by default.
References
None listed.
CIS Controls
| Controls Version | Control | IG 1 | IG 2 | IG 3 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| v6 | 14.4 Protect Information With Access Control Lists | N | Y | Y |
| v7 | 14.6 Protect Information through Access Control Lists | Y | Y | Y |
MITRE ATT&CK Mappings
| Tactic | Technique |
|---|---|
| Privilege Escalation | T1611 Escape to Host |
| Defense Evasion | T1562 Impair Defenses |
Profile
- Level 2 - Caching Only Name Server
- Level 2 - Authoritative Name Server