jleo-topic-selection

Business

Use when scoping or pitching a topic for a Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (JLEO) manuscript — testing whether the question is a genuine law-economics-organization / positive-political-economy contribution rather than a sibling-journal fit. Sharpens the question and its audience; it does not design identification or build the model.

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Source SKILL.md: https://github.com/brycewang-stanford/Awesome-Journal-Skills/blob/HEAD/Journal-of-Law-Economics-and-Organization-Skills/skills/jleo-topic-selection/SKILL.md

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Topic Selection (jleo-topic-selection)

When to trigger

You have a result or a model and are unsure whether JLEO is the right home versus JLE, JLS, ALER, or Organization Science
A reduced-form finding about a legal rule exists but the institutional or organizational payoff is not yet articulated
A coauthor asks "is this law-and-economics enough, or is it really just applied micro / political science?"
A formal PPE model is built but its connection to a real institution (a legislature, a court, a regulatory agency, a firm boundary) is thin
The topic feels adjacent to JLEO but the organization/governance angle has not been made the headline

What JLEO actually rewards

JLEO was founded in 1985 by Williamson and Mashaw to host the law-economics-organization synthesis, and its center of gravity has stayed there. A JLEO topic earns its place when the payoff is an institutional or organizational claim — about why a governance structure, contract form, or political institution takes the shape it does, and what follows. Run the candidate topic through these tests:

The organization test. Is there a genuine organization — a firm boundary, a hierarchy, a governance structure, a committee, a bureaucracy, a court — whose form or behavior the paper explains? Pure market-outcome questions belong at JLE. JLEO wants the inside or the design of the institution.
The mechanism test. Can you name the institutional mechanism in one sentence (transaction-cost economizing, agency/incentive, credible commitment, separation of powers, hold-up, residual control)? If the "mechanism" is just "X affects Y," the topic is not yet a JLEO topic.
The dual-tradition test. Does it speak to either transaction-cost / theory-of-the-firm economics or positive political economy (the North–Weingast–Williamson institutional line)? Topics fitting neither tradition are usually sibling fits.
The both-methods test. JLEO publishes formal theory and empirics. If the paper is purely descriptive with no model and no credible design, ask which it will become.
The "so what for institutions" test. Does the result change how we understand institutional design or governance choice — not just estimate a parameter?

Branch by what you have

You are holding	JLEO-fit move	Trap to avoid
A causal effect of a legal/regulatory rule	Recast the payoff as an institutional/governance claim, or send to JLE	Selling a market effect as if it were organizational
A make-or-buy / contract-form pattern in firm data	Frame as transaction-cost governance choice with selection acknowledged	Descriptive correlation with no governance logic
A formal model of a political institution	Tie comparative statics to a real legislature/court/agency; add a test or institutional case	A model with no institutional anchor (reads as pure theory)
An organizational/personnel finding inside firms	Position in the economics-of-organization line (agency, incentives), not org-behavior	Drifting into Organization Science's behavioral register
A historical-institutions / development result	Connect to credible-commitment / institutions-and-growth PPE canon	A history paper with no institutional-economics frame

Checklist

The institutional or organizational object of study is named, not just a market or outcome
The mechanism is stated in one sentence in a recognized JLEO tradition (TCE / agency / PPE / theory of the firm)
The paper is clearly TCE-/theory-of-the-firm or PPE flavored, not a JLE price-theory or Org-Science behavioral fit
You can name the JLEO audience segment that would champion it — and the one that would desk-reject it
If empirical, there is a credible design in view; if theoretical, a real institution it speaks to
Process facts cited are in resources/official-source-map.md or marked 待核实

Anti-patterns

Pitching a pure market-outcome study (antitrust, crime, price effects of a rule) as JLEO when it is a JLE paper
A PPE model with no institution it actually describes — comparative statics floating free of any legislature, court, or agency
Borrowing Organization Science's behavioral/sociological framing for an economics-of-organization venue
"Law and economics" as a label pasted on an applied-micro paper with no governance or institutional mechanism
Inventing exemplar JLEO papers, editor names, or fees rather than marking uncertainty

Worked vignette (illustrative)

A team has a clean estimate that a court reform sped up commercial dispute resolution. As a market-outcome paper ("faster courts raise local investment") this is a JLE candidate. The JLEO recast keeps the same data but makes the institutional object the payoff: the reform changed the governance of adjudication (specialized vs. generalist judges), and the paper asks which disputes the specialized structure economizes on — a transaction-cost question about the organization of the courts, not just a growth effect. Same finding, but now the contribution is about institutional design, and the audience that champions it is the JLEO institutional-economics community rather than applied-micro generalists.

Output format

【Journal】The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (JLEO)
【Skill】jleo-topic-selection
【Verdict】pass / revise / reroute (to JLE / JLS / ALER / Org Science / QJPS)
【Institutional object】the organization/institution the paper explains
【Mechanism (one sentence)】TCE / agency / commitment / separation-of-powers / hold-up / ...
【Tradition】transaction-cost-economics / theory-of-the-firm / positive-political-economy
【Sibling boundary】why JLEO and not the nearest neighbor
【Source status】verified URL / 待核实
【Next skill】jleo-literature-positioning